US Commerce Department Adopts Rule Restricting Remote Access to Advanced AI Chips
On November 16, 2026, the US Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) announced an interim final rule (IFR) amending the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). The IFR restricts the ability of companies headquartered in China and certain other countries to remotely access advanced AI chips and servers.The IFR uses the term “super intelligence” (SI) in place of AI. BIS states that it designed the IFR to keep companies from using data centers in third countries to evade existing limits on access to sensitive US technology. Unusually, BIS’s announcement also states that the Department of the Treasury and the National Security Council wrote and directed the rule.
The IFR:
- adds a new end-use control for exports, reexports, and transfers (in-country) of advanced computing items controlled under Export Control Classification Numbers (ECCNs) 3A090 (other than 3A090.c) and 4A090 and the corresponding .z items, including advanced chips, computers and servers containing such chips, and related software and technology (collectively, Covered Items), to data centers, wherever located, that supply large volumes of compute to companies headquartered in, or with an ultimate parent headquartered in China, Macau, or another destination in the EAR’s Country Group D:5Country Group D:5 countries are Afghanistan, Belarus, Burma, Central African Republic, China, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Cuba, Eritrea, Haiti, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Lebanon, Libya, Nicaragua, Russia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. (Restricted Entities);
- clarifies that existing rules already require a license to export, reexport, or transfer Covered Items when a Restricted Entity is the purchaser or the exclusive or primary user of the data center’s compute;
- requires a license to export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) Covered Items to or within Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Brazil;
- narrows how foundries and chip packagers can clear advanced chips they make for designers in China, other countries of concern, and the five newly listed countries; and
- formally rescinds the AI Diffusion Rule, which the Biden Administration published on January 15, 2025, while keeping a few of its provisions.
The IFR took effect on its scheduled Federal Register publication date, November 19, 2026. BIS is accepting comments for 60 days after publication, through January 18, 2027.
This Client Alert answers 10 key questions about the IFR.
1. What new data center license requirements did the rule impose?
New Section 744.24 of the EAR requires a license to export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) Covered Items when the exporter has “knowledge” (including reason to know) that the items will go to a data center, wherever located, that provides or will provide direct or indirect access to more than 12 million in aggregate Total Processing Performance (TPP)This is equivalent to roughly 760 Nvidia H100s. to or for one or more Restricted Entities. The threshold counts compute at one data center or across “linked data centers.” The IFR defines linked data centers to include digitally linked, not just physically linked, facilities that share resources, balance workloads, and replicate data as a unified whole. BIS will review license applications case by case. BIS states that the control also reaches a data center that serves a non-D:5 customer if that customer trains AI models for a D:5-headquartered company, helps to train them, or supplies models to such a company.
The IFR also lets BIS inform specific parties (i.e., through “is informed” letters), or amend the EAR, to require a license where BIS sees an unacceptable risk of use in, or diversion to, the prohibited data center end use. The Secretary of State or the National Security Advisor may also identify new high-risk destinations to the Commerce Department.
Exporters, reexporters, and transferors that ship a Covered Item without a license (i.e., because they lack “knowledge” of a prohibited end use and no other license requirement applies) are affirmatively required to provide a notification to the recipient. The notice must state that BIS authorization is required if the item will be used at a data center to provide more than 12 million aggregate TPP to or for a Restricted Entity. It must also state that the transferor (e.g., the data center operator) must obtain that authorization and must follow the EAR’s know-your-customer guidance in Supplement No. 3 to Part 732.
A change from a permitted to a prohibited end use after the item reaches the data center counts as a “transfer (in-country)” and requires BIS authorization. For example, if a data center using Covered Items begins providing more than 12 million aggregate TPP to or for Restricted Entities, the IFR states that “the owner, operator of the overseas data center, or other party making the transfer” must obtain a license. This rule applies even if the current holder of the items took no part in the original export. The IFR does not address which party must apply where the data center operator does not own the chips (e.g., a colocation facility hosting a cloud provider’s GPUs), a point companies may wish to raise in comments.
2. What are the obligations on companies already providing this type of data center access?
Non-US data centers or computer service providers that provided significant compute to Restricted Entities before the IFR’s publication, and that wish to continue doing so, must obtain a license within 90 days of the effective date (i.e., by February 17, 2027, based on the scheduled publication date). BIS warns that those that do not will “face future export restrictions.” The text requires an issued license by the deadline, so affected parties (e.g., GPU owners, cloud providers, and potentially data center operators) should promptly determine who will apply and, where relevant, allocate that responsibility contractually. The IFR does not define “significant” for this purpose or signal how BIS will treat applications for existing arrangements. It appears the license application should be submitted electronically through the BIS SNAP-R portal, which also requires pre-registration for new users and could add to the submission time.
3. Are there exceptions to the new data center license requirements?
Section 744.24 does not apply where a data center provides computing power only for a “commercial recommender system.” The IFR defines this term as an AI tool “exclusively designed and exclusively used to rank, filter, or suggest commercial products, services, or content to users based on user behavior, transaction history, or item attributes.” The definition excludes any system that generates novel text, images, audio, video, software, or other content, even if it also makes recommendations. To use the exclusion, the exporter, reexporter, or transferor must submit to BIS the Restricted Entity’s name, the aggregate TPP provided to it, and the due diligence performed to confirm the exclusive recommender use.
No license exception can overcome the Section 744.24 requirements unless BIS says otherwise. Nor can reexporters and transferors rely on the EAR’s de minimis rules. This bar applies when a US-origin Covered Item is incorporated into or commingled with a foreign-made item and there is “knowledge,” at any point in the chain of development, production, or use, that the item will serve a prohibited end use.
4. What diligence obligations does this control impose on exporters?
To show that it lacks “knowledge,” an exporter must obtain, and be able to produce, enough information about the foreign data center’s know-your-customer checks. Those checks must cover whether persons located in, headquartered in, or whose ultimate parent is headquartered in Macau or a D:5 country either directly or indirectly own or control any customer. BIS treats a data center’s inability or refusal to supply this information as a red flag. That red flag presumptively gives the exporter “knowledge” (which includes not just actual knowledge, but reason to know) unless the exporter resolves it before going forward. BIS also expects foreign data centers to vet their own customers.
5. Does this rule clarify any other end-use controls, and if so, what is the impact?
The IFR’s preamble “clarifies” the scope of the EAR’s “for an entity” control. Since November 17, 2023, the effective date of BIS’s October 2023 Advanced Computing/Supercomputing IFR, the EAR have required a license to export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) Covered Items to destinations outside Country Groups D:1, D:4, and D:5 “for an entity” that is a Restricted Entity. Before the IFR, this requirement sat in Section 742.6(a)(6)(iii)(A), and BIS’s May 31, 2026, guidance confirmed that BIS was enforcing it. In that guidance, BIS explained: “Bona fide operators of data centers who are otherwise engaged in activities consistent with the EAR are not required to cease the ongoing use, storage, disposal, or servicing of advanced computing items because of this guidance, until further notice from BIS.”
Notably, the IFR states that this “for an entity” language “is not, and has never been,” limited to exports directly to Restricted Entities. It also reaches transactions “on behalf of” a Restricted Entity. The IFR states that examples include cases where a Restricted Entity was the direct or indirect purchaser, “or was the exclusive or primary (more than 50 percent of total compute) remote end user of the data center’s computing capacity” (emphasis added). BIS states that parties out of compliance “should submit a voluntary self-disclosure.” BIS also encourages parties to analyze both Section 744.23(a)(3) and new Section 744.24 for any data center transaction where a Restricted Entity will be a remote end user.
6. Did the rule impose new country-based restrictions? Are there any exceptions?
The IFR requires a license to export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) Covered Items to or within Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Brazil. BIS states that these countries “present a higher-than-normal risk of diversion.” The Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the Secretary of State or the National Security Advisor, may add countries. Commerce also plans to monitor “for countries that tolerate evasion of this IFR and will consider a range of consequences for such countries.” Consequences could include import restrictions, new license requirements, or a downgrade of a country’s export control status. Commerce may also add foreign persons that take part in evasion to the Entity List or temporarily bar them from exports.
The requirement does not reach shipments to an ultimate consignee or end user that is headquartered in the United States, or whose ultimate parent is. To use this exclusion, the exporter, reexporter, or transferor must file monthly reports under new Section 743.10. Each report must identify every party and its ultimate parent, the ultimate destination, each product’s paragraph-level ECCN, name, SKU, TPP, and quantity, and the shipment date. Reports are due by the first business day of the month after the transaction. Companies headquartered outside the United States, including those in close allied countries, get no comparable exclusion. License exceptions for these five countries are also limited to those listed in Section 740.2(a)(9)(ii), such as License Exception Advanced Compute Manufacturing (ACM).
7. Did the rule make changes to country-based licensing policies?
The IFR removes the worldwide Regional Stability license requirement that the AI Diffusion Rule imposed on Covered Items. Licenses remain required for China and other destinations in Country Groups D:1, D:4, and D:5 (other than destinations also in Country Groups A:5 or A:6). They also remain required for the United Arab Emirates (UAE), except for approved UAE entities under BIS’s July 2026 UAE rule. The five countries discussed in Question 6 now join this list. BIS will review license applications as follows:
- Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Brazil: Case-by-case review
- China or Macau, for chips with TPP below 21,000 and total DRAM bandwidth below 6,500 GB/s: Case-by-case review, if the applicant supplies the additional information BIS requires
- Other D:5 or Macau destinations, or entities headquartered there: Presumption of denial
- Other destinations in Country Groups D:1 and D:4 and the UAE: Presumption of approval
- Licenses required under Section 744.24 (data center end use): Case-by-case review
8. Does the rule include measures impacting foundries and chip packagers?
Yes. The IFR tightens rules for chip foundries (front-end fabricators) and chip packagers (outsourced semiconductor assembly and test (OSAT) companies). Under BIS’s January 2025 foundry due diligence rule, foundries and packagers must presume that an advanced logic chip they make is a controlled, data center-grade chip (ECCN 3A090.a) unless they can show otherwise through specified steps.
The IFR makes two changes in this area:
- First, new Section 744.23(a)(3)(i)(C) requires foundries and packagers to obtain a license to ship a 3A090.a chip to any destination if the designer is neither an “approved IC designer” (listed in Supplement No. 6 to Part 740) nor an “authorized IC designer” (meeting the criteria in Note 1 to ECCN 3A090.a). BIS presents this provision as preserving an existing license requirement after the worldwide requirement’s removal. Foundries and packagers can still overcome the presumption by following the due diligence steps in Note 1.
- Second, the IFR narrows those steps for chips whose designer is located in, or has an ultimate parent headquartered in, China or another destination in Country Group D:1, D:4, or D:5, or one of the five newly listed countries. For these designers, a foundry or packager can no longer rely on its own, or an approved OSAT’s, attestation that the finished chip falls below the transistor-count thresholds (generally 30 billion). Only an attestation from an approved or authorized IC designer will now overcome the presumption. Foundries should also note that, after December 31, 2026, an authorized IC designer must have applied to become an approved IC designer, and authorized status lapses 180 days after that application.
9. Following this IFR, what is the status of the Biden Administration’s AI Diffusion Rule?
The IFR formally rescinds the Biden Administration’s AI Diffusion Rule which was published on January 15, 2025. Although the Commerce Department announced on May 13, 2025 — before the rule’s compliance date — that it would not enforce the rule, the rule’s provisions stayed in the EAR until now.
In particular, the IFR removes: (a) the AI model weights control (ECCN 4E091); (b) the three-tier licensing framework (under which 18 close US allies could receive advanced chips largely without a license, Country Group D:5 destinations faced a presumption of denial, and all other countries were subject to compute caps); (c) License Exceptions Artificial Intelligence Authorization (AIA) and Low Processing Performance (LPP); (d) the Data Center Validated End User authorization; and (e) the AI model weights foreign direct product rule.
The IFR keeps License Exception ACM, which supports supply chains for advanced items destined for end users outside Macau and Country Group D:5. It also keeps the worldwide scope of the advanced computing foreign direct product (FDP) rule in Section 734.9(h)(2)(i). BIS stresses that it retains jurisdiction over a 3A090 chip subject to that rule even after a foreign company builds it into a GPU board or server. Because ECCN 4A090 and .z items by definition contain a 3A090 chip, BIS views downstream recipients of those items as on notice of this jurisdiction.
10. What is the rule’s impact on US-based data centers?
The IFR does not appear to directly regulate data centers located in the United States, even if they give Restricted Entities remote access to Covered Items. It does, however, reach data centers outside the United States that US-headquartered companies own or operate. Further legislative or regulatory action that reaches US data centers is possible.
The House passed the Remote Access Security Act in January 2026, and the bill awaits Senate action. That bill would expressly authorize BIS to regulate remote access to certain EAR-controlled items in the United States. See Latham’s Client Alert on the Remote Access Security Act for further background on this measure.
The IFR’s legal footing may also draw scrutiny. BIS previously advised that providing computational capacity is not subject to the EAR because the provider ships or transmits no item to the user. The IFR attaches license requirements to the chips that are shipped to data centers, rather than to cloud access itself. In October 2023, BIS said it was concerned that China could use cloud services to undermine its chip controls and that it “continues to evaluate” a regulatory response — BIS invited public comment on the issue.
Companies that want to shape the rule should consider filing comments before the January 18, 2027, comment deadline.
The authors would like to thank Matt Chopp for his contribution to this Client Alert.