Since December 2023, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU or the Court) has handed down a series of significant rulings that have clarified how EU competition law applies to sport. The December 2023 trio of European Superleague (C-333/21), International Skating Union (C-124/21), and Royal Antwerp (C-680/21) confirmed, once again, the instrumental role of EU rules on competition and fundamental freedoms in shaping sports governance.Case C-333/21, European Superleague, 21 December 2023, EU:C:2023:1011; Case C-124/21, ISU, 21 December 2023, EU:C:2023:1012; Case C-680/21, Royal Antwerp, 21 December 2023, EU:C:2023:1010.
In European Superleague and International Skating Union the CJEU found that pre-authorisation rules without transparent, non-discriminatory criteria may constitute “by object” restrictions under Article 101(1) TFEU and abuses of dominance under Article 102 TFEU, while in Royal Antwerp the CJEU adopted a more nuanced approach to home-grown player quotas. In October 2024, in Diarra (C-650/22) the CJEU addressed FIFA’s transfer compensation and sanctions rules, finding that certain provisions constituted restrictions “by object” and drawing a parallel with no-poach agreements in labour markets.Case C-650/22, Diarra v. FIFA, 4 October 2024, EU:C:2024:824.
Recent CJEU judgments building on this framework provide additional guidance for stakeholders. We outline below their main findings and potential implications.
The case arose during the COVID-19 pandemic. When Portugal declared a state of emergency in March 2020 and football competition was suspended, clubs in the Portuguese First and Second Divisions concluded an agreement — with the Portuguese Professional Football League (LPFP) — not to recruit any player who had unilaterally terminated their employment contract citing the pandemic or the extension of the sporting season. The aim was to preserve clubs’ financial stability and prevent an exodus of players from smaller to wealthier clubs during an unprecedented disruption. In April 2022, the Portuguese Competition Authority found the agreement restrictive of competition by object and imposed sanctions. On appeal, the Tribunal da Concorrência, Regulação e Supervisão referred three questions to the CJEU.
The referring court considered that, in ordinary circumstances, an agreement among competing employers not to poach workers amounts to a “by object” restriction on competition — equivalent to sharing “sources of supply” under Article 101(1)(c) TFEU — but sought guidance from the CJEU on whether the specific context of professional sports and the pandemic might alter that analysis.
The CJEU stated that a no-poach agreement between clubs is, by its content, a “manifest restriction of a competitive parameter which plays an essential role in high-level sport”, and is therefore equivalent to a horizontal agreement for sharing sources of supply.Case C-133/24 - CD Tondela, 30 April 2026, EU:C:2026:361, paras 53-54. The CJEU, however, found that the examination of content alone “does not suffice by itself” to support a by-object classification;Case C-133/24 - CD Tondela, 30 April 2026, EU:C:2026:361, paras 56, 78, and 88. the economic and legal context may lead to a different conclusion.
The Court confirmed its two-tier approach: Conduct that is “particularly harmful to competition” (such as cartels) requires only a limited contextual assessment, whereas other conduct that may be restrictive by object “without necessarily being equally harmful” demands a more in-depth examination of the economic and legal context, aimed at determining whether that conduct pursues a manifest anticompetitive rationale.Case C-133/24 - CD Tondela, 30 April 2026, EU:C:2026:361, paras 41, 47-48, and 50.
No-poach agreements fall in the second category. The referring court must conduct a full examination of content, economic and legal context — including, in casu, the interdependence between clubs, the need for competitive balance, and the pandemic’s specific impact on roster stability and club finances — and the agreement’s objective aims from a competition standpoint.
On 9 July 2026, the CJEU ruled in ROGONCase C-428/23, ROGON, 9 July 2026, EU:C:2026:563. — a preliminary reference from the Bundesgerichtshof concerning the German Football Federation’s (DFB) regulations on players’ agents (the RfSV, in force since 1 April 2015). Three players’ agent businesses challenged DFB rules relating to registration obligations on agents, requiring submission to DFB and FIFA jurisdictions, prohibiting agents from taking shares in future transfer proceeds, banning commission payments for transfers of minors, and mandating disclosure of agent fees. They argued that the Wouters/Meca-Medina exception could not apply because agents are not DFB members and the regulations affect a services market upstream from that regulated by DFB.
The Court clarified the Wouters/Meca-Medina exception may apply to regulations adopted by a sports federation which, while addressing its members, also govern the use of the services of third-party undertakings not belonging to that federation, provided that those regulations:
By its second question, the Bundesgerichtshof asked whether the proportionality conditions of the Wouters/Meca-Medina framework must be assessed separately for each individual provision of a sports governing body’s regulations, or whether they may be applied to a set of related provisions as a whole. The CJEU responded that where several provisions pursue the same objective or produce the same effect, they may be assessed together as a whole; conversely, where provisions serve distinct purposes or have distinct effects, an independent proportionality assessment is required.Case C-428/23, ROGON, 9 July 2026, EU:C:2026:563, paras. 67-68.
Ultimately, however, the Court left it to the Bundesgerichtshof to determine whether the specific provisions of the RfSV actually satisfy the three conditions of the Wouters/Meca-Medina framework.
On 16 July 2026, the CJEU delivered its judgment in RRC Sports — a reference from the Landgericht Mainz (Germany) challenging FIFA’s global Football Agent Regulations (FFAR). The case was brought by a football agent (FT) and RRC Sports GmbH. Unlike ROGON, which concerned a national federation’s framework, RRC Sports challenged FIFA’s regime under Articles 101, 102, and 56 TFEU, as well as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). The FFAR, adopted on 16 December 2022, regulated agent regulations worldwide including: remuneration caps calculated as a percentage of the transfer fee or player’s annual salary (Art. 15(2)); restrictions on who may pay the agent’s fee (Art. 14(2)-(3)); limits dual representation of clubs and player in the same transaction (Art. 12(8)-(9)); mandatory licensing with submission to FIFA’s rules and disciplinary jurisdiction (Art. 4(2), 16(2)(b), 20); non-solicitation rules limiting when agents may approach clients bound by exclusive agreements with other agents (Art. 16(1)(b)-(c)); and extensive disclosure obligations requiring uploading of transaction details, including remuneration, onto FIFA’s platform (Art. 19).
The Court’s analysis proceeded rule by rule, grouping the challenged provisions into five categories: (i) dual representation restrictions; (ii) remuneration rules; (iii) licensing conditions; (iv) non-solicitation (“approach”) rules; and (v) disclosure obligations. For each category, the Court assessed whether the rules constituted restrictions “by object” or “by effect” under Article 101(1) TFEU, whether they could benefit from the Wouters/Meca-Medina exception or from the Article 101(3) TFEU exemption, and whether they amounted to an abuse of dominance under Article 102 TFEU or a restriction on free movement of services under Article 56 TFEU.Case C-209/23, RRC Sports, 16 July 2026, EU:C:2026:597, para 64.
On the “by object” question, the Court held that most of the challenged rules — including the dual representation restrictions, remuneration caps, licensing requirements, and disclosure obligations — do not appear to constitute restrictions “by object” because they do not, by their nature, reveal a sufficient degree of harm to competition.Case C-209/23, RRC Sports, 16 July 2026, EU:C:2026:597, paras. 114–118. One potential exception concerned a rule that could deprive agents of remuneration earned from a prior transfer if the player subsequently moved clubs (Art. 14(12)(a)) — the Court indicated this may constitute a “by object” restriction, but left the final determination to the national court. Case C-209/23, RRC Sports, 16 July 2026, EU:C:2026:597, para. 118.
For rules constituting restrictions “by effect,” the Court confirmed that the Wouters/Meca-Medina framework applies. However, the Court consistently left it to the Landgericht Mainz to determine whether the specific rules actually satisfy the three conditions of necessity, proportionality, and absence of disproportionate effects on competition. Separately, on the GDPR question, the Court found that GDPR Article 6(1)(f) precludes two transparency provisions of Article 19 FFAR: the publication of sanctions imposed on agents or their clients (Art. 19(d)), and the publication of detailed information on all transactions involving agents (Art. 19(e)).Case C-209/23, RRC Sports, 16 July 2026, EU:C:2026:597, para. 383.
The Court offered more pointed guidance on the non-solicitation rules (Art. 16(1)(b)-(c)), which limit the ability of agents from approaching or contracting with players already bound by exclusive representation agreements with other agents (except during the final two months of such agreements). The Court expressed doubt that these rules could be justified, noting that FIFA’s stated objective — providing “clarity” on when agents may approach players — does not appear to constitute a legitimate public-interest objective and, even if it did, the rules are not applied coherently since agents already bound by representation agreements face no equivalent restriction.Case C-209/23, RRC Sports, 16 July 2026, EU:C:2026:597, paras. 152–158.
The Article 102 TFEU analysis followed similar lines. The Court confirmed that FIFA, as the global governing body with 211 member associations bound to apply its rules, may hold a dominant position on the various relevant markets on which it exercises regulatory, control and sanctioning powers. In principle, the same justifications and proportionality analysis applicable under Article 101 TFEU apply to the abuse of dominance assessment, although these conditions may prove difficult to satisfy in practice.Case C-209/23, RRC Sports, 16 July 2026, EU:C:2026:597, paras. 239–244. The Court also addressed Article 56 TFEU (free movement of services), finding that the FFAR provisions may constitute restrictions on cross-border service provision but could potentially be justified by the same legitimate objectives, subject to proportionality. As with the competition law analysis, the Court left these determinations to the national court.Case C-209/23, RRC Sports, 16 July 2026, EU:C:2026:597, para. 310.
On 16 July 2026, the CJEU delivered its judgment in the joined cases CONI/FIGC — references from the TAR Lazio raising fundamentally different questions from the competition law cases above. The proceedings concerned ZD and MI, respectively a former chairman and former board member of Juventus Football Club, who were each sanctioned with a 24-month ban from professional activity by the Federazione Italiana Giuoco Calcio’s (FIGC’s) Federal Court of Appeal for false financial and accounting statements in breach of Articles 4 and 31 of the FIGC Sports Justice Code. The bans were extended globally by FIFA. Under Italian law (Decree-Law No. 220/2003, converted into Law No. 280/2003), as interpreted by the Corte costituzionale, national administrative courts cannot annul or suspend sports disciplinary sanctions but may only award damages once “the instances of sports justice have been exhausted.”
The referring court asked three questions: (i) whether Article 2 of Law No. 280/2003, which limits the national court’s remedial powers to damages only, is compatible with Article 19(1) TEU and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter); (ii) whether a 24-month professional activity ban can be imposed on the basis of a general clause requiring “honesty, fairness and integrity” without more specific offence definitions, engaging Articles 48 and 49 of the Charter; and (iii) whether Articles 45, 49, 56, 101, and 102 TFEU preclude sports bodies from imposing cross-border professional activity bans on club directors.
The Court’s analysis proceeded in two steps. First, on the substantive question (whether sports bodies can impose such sanctions at all), the Court addressed only Articles 45 and 56 TFEU — finding the questions inadmissible insofar as they concerned Articles 49, 101, and 102 TFEU because the referring court had not sufficiently explained their relevance. Second, on the procedural question (whether Italy’s damages-only system satisfies EU requirements for effective judicial protection), the Court interpreted Article 19(1) TEU in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter.
On the free movement question, the Court confirmed that sanctions such as the 24-month professional activity bans at issue — which can be extended by UEFA and FIFA to cover all Member States — constitute restrictions on the freedom of movement for workers (Article 45 TFEU) and the freedom to provide services (Article 56 TFEU). However, such restrictions can be justified if: (i) the provisions allowing the association to impose such sanctions pursue one or more legitimate objectives in the public interest, compatible with the Treaty (other than purely economic objectives); and (ii) the provisions observe the principle of proportionality, meaning they are appropriate for achieving those objectives in a consistent and systematic manner, and the determination of sanctions on a case-by-case basis is subject to transparent, objective, and non-discriminatory criteria that allow account to be taken of all relevant circumstances and are amenable to effective judicial review.Cases C-424/24 and C-425/24, CONI/FIGC, 16 July 2026, EU:C:2026:602, paras. 62-66.
The Court identified the proper conduct of sporting competitions as a legitimate objective capable of justifying such restrictions, noting that disciplinary measures penalising the production of false financial statements are appropriate means of pursuing that objective. However, it left the TAR Lazio to verify whether the sanctions genuinely reflect a concern to attain this objective in a consistent and systematic manner, and whether the determination of sanctions satisfies the transparency, objectivity, and proportionality requirements.Cases C-424/24 and C-425/24, CONI/FIGC, 16 July 2026, EU:C:2026:602, paras. 72–77.
On the effective judicial protection question — the most significant aspect of the judgment — the Court held that national legislation limiting courts to damages-only remedies is not per se incompatible with Article 19(1) TEU and Article 47 of the Charter. The critical condition is that, at the very least, the body forming part of “national sports justice” that gives a decision at last instance must satisfy five cumulative requirements: (i) it must be a “court or tribunal” within the meaning of EU law, providing the requisite guarantees of independence and impartiality; (ii) it must be previously established by law as regards its existence, composition, and organisation; (iii) it must have a judicial (as opposed to merely disciplinary) function; (iv) the procedure before it must offer the requisite guarantees, in particular those relating to respect for the rights of the defence and the principle that parties should be heard; and (v) it must be in a position to exercise prior effective judicial review of the sanction.Cases C-424/24 and C-425/24, CONI/FIGC, 16 July 2026, EU:C:2026:602, para. 114.
The Court emphasised that effective judicial review must extend to all questions of fact and law relevant to the dispute, including the legal and factual reasons for the sanction and the sanction’s determination in light of the individual circumstances. The national court must be able to draw appropriate legal conclusions from any finding of an EU law infringement — not merely note that an infringement occurred. Interim measures must also be available where necessary to ensure the effectiveness of the final judgment. Importantly, the Court confirmed that the national court having jurisdiction must be able, if necessary, to refer questions to the CJEU under Article 267 TFEU.Cases C-424/24 and C-425/24, CONI/FIGC, 16 July 2026, EU:C:2026:602, paras. 87-92.
The Court left it to the TAR Lazio to determine whether the FIGC’s sports judicial bodies — including the Federal Court of Appeal and Comitato Olimpico Nazionale Italiano’s (CONI’s) Sports Guarantee Board — actually satisfy these requirements. It noted that a general reference in national law to “the statutes and regulations” of sports associations is not sufficient to establish that the bodies are “previously established by law”; their composition, organisation, judicial function, and procedural guarantees must be provided for by law so as not to be left to the discretion of the executive, judiciary, or the sports associations themselves.
The CJEU has provided further pieces of the analytical framework for the assessment of sports rules under European competition law while leaving it to national courts to apply that framework to the specific facts. In each case, the Court declined to make definitive findings on whether the challenged conduct satisfied the relevant legal tests, instead remitting those questions for determination by the referring courts in light of the full factual record.
We now have a comprehensive framework of guidelines from the CJEU to national courts and stakeholders. These recent rulings confirm the increased sophistication with which courts and enforcers in the EU will assess conduct by sports governing bodies. Conduct by sports governing bodies will presumably continue to be closely scrutinised under EU law, but the CJEU has carefully articulated a legal framework that is mindful of the need for proportionate rules pursuing legitimate sporting aims.
The authors would like to thank Luca Donatella and Filippo Callisto for their contribution to this briefing.