CLOs: The Leveraged Loan Market’s Most Idiosyncratic Investors
Key Points:
- Collateralised loan obligations (CLOs) hold over 65% of European leveraged loans, making them the dominant investor class in the market, but their structural constraints cause them to act differently from conventional investors.
- CLO trading decisions prioritise par value preservation over market value maximisation, creating distinctive demand patterns — including strong demand for assets priced just above the “Discount Obligation” threshold and a willingness to hold deteriorating credits that still carry par value.
- In amendments and restructurings, CLOs face rigid portfolio constraints that can prevent participation regardless of economic merit; understanding these limitations — and how they vary by CLO vintage — is essential for structuring transactions that achieve broad lender support.
Introduction
The European collateralised loan obligation (CLO) market is a critical part of the global credit intermediation system. By repackaging corporate loans into tranched and rated securities that capital market investors can invest in, CLOs transform institutional capital markets funding into corporate lending. It is estimated that European CLOs now hold more than 65% of all European leveraged loans.https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/152771/html. Given how influential CLOs are in the leveraged loan market, it is important to understand how they operate. Unlike conventional institutional investors whose investment decisions are typically driven purely by the credit considerations of an investment, CLOs operate within structural constraints that can distort their investment incentives, resulting in actions that may seem perverse when judged through the lens of maximising returns and minimising credit losses. CLOs are, however, rational actors and, given how significant they are as an investor pool, there is benefit in understanding what makes them tick.
What Is a CLO?
At its core, a CLO is a managed pool of largely senior secured loans whose investment flexibility is constrained by the terms upon which it has been financed. Similar to other traditional debt funds or discretionary asset management portfolios, CLO portfolios are shaped by contractually agreed portfolio management limitations. However, there are certain key features of CLOs that cause collateral managers to act in a distinctive manner when trading and managing their portfolios:
- CLOs are set up as “buy-to-hold” cashflow strategies, as opposed to traded funds that incentivise the active churn of assets to maximise returns. The portfolio constraints reflect this strategy and therefore the ability to trade is subject to strict reinvestment tests and limitations around the percentage of the portfolio that can be sold annually.Discretionary sales tend to be limited to 25-30% of the portfolio annually.
- CLOs issue rated, tranched securities, with the most senior tranche rated “AAA” by at least two credit rating agencies. The collateral manager is therefore heavily constrained by rating agency criteria because it needs to ensure it can obtain and then sustain the rating ascribed to each tranche.
- A CLO is not a mark-to-market structure and instead accounts for the face value of an asset when calculating its borrowing base, with few exceptions (such as with respect to defaulted assets or significantly discounted assets). Put simply, when determining whether a CLO has sufficient collateral to support its outstanding liabilities, the CLO’s overcollateralisation test compares the par value (not market value) of the collateral to the principal amount of the CLO’s rated notes. A failure to satisfy this test results in the senior notes being amortised, therefore heavily incentivising a collateral manager to preserve par rather than maximise net market value gains.
- CLOs have traditionally employed performing-credit strategies (actively managing non-distressed loans) with a limited ability to hold an asset through a distressed workout. In recent years, the flexibility to participate in restructurings has increased but, even where a CLO can participate in a restructuring, restructured assets often end up being ascribed a reduced (or zero) value in the context of its overcollateralisation tests.
Managing the Portfolio in Practice
Having set out the unique structural features that define a CLO, we will consider how these features might incentivise collateral managers to make decisions differently from a regular institutional investor when trading, participating in amendments or being involved in a distressed workout.
The economics of trading
When trading, a collateral manager considers a lot more than just the market value or return-profile of an asset. Instead, it will be aiming to maximise par while ensuring no CLO tests are breached. This can lead to decisions that might baffle other market participants.
When purchasing assets, CLOs are price-sensitive, but not in the same way as other investors. Collateral managers are, to a degree, incentivised to purchase and hold discounted assets. An asset priced below par but above a specified floor (usually around 80%) is very attractive to CLOs because it receives par value in the overcollateralisation tests. There is, however, a structural safety feature that disincentivises CLOs from purchasing deeply distressed assets — anything priced below this floor is considered a “Discount Obligation” and is valued within the CLO at its purchase price (as opposed to its par value). This creates a CLO demand curve that strengthens as the price of the asset falls towards the specified floor, with an abrupt pullback when the asset hits the Discount Obligation threshold. While a typical investor might, given a sound investment proposition, be willing to purchase an asset at 79%, a CLO may be disincentivised from doing so until and unless the asset climbs above the Discount Obligation threshold — after all, an asset purchased at 79% is valued at 79% for the purposes of the overcollateralisation tests, but an asset purchased at 81% is valued at par.
Where asset disposals are concerned, a regular investor might choose to dispose of a deteriorating or volatile credit to avoid stressing the fund’s economics. A CLO might nonetheless hold a deteriorating albeit performing asset because the asset continues to be carried at par for the purposes of its overcollateralisation test. The CLO has the ability to wait out market volatility in such a scenario because its borrowing base is generally not impacted by fluctuating market value.
At first glance, these actions can seem irrational to an external observer, but once they understand a CLO’s trading incentives, the CLO market’s behaviour becomes a lot easier to predict.
Participation in asset amendment processes
Whether a CLO can participate in an asset amendment is never simply a question of whether participation results in an increased market value for the asset. Instead, collateral managers have to determine whether the portfolio constraints permit such participation, regardless of its merits.
Borrowers commonly seek an extension of the maturity date of an asset to preserve access to financing. A borrower can usually incentivise a rational investor to agree to the amendment by demonstrating that the asset’s value will increase or by providing a sweetener such as an incentive fee. This is, however, insufficient for a CLO, which can typically only vote in favour of a maturity amendment if, amongst other requirements, the weighted average life testThe weighted average life test measures the weighted average maturity of the assets in the CLO’s portfolio. CLO documents impose a maximum weighted average life to ensure the portfolio matures within a timeframe consistent with the CLO’s own debt maturity profile. is satisfied. If these rigid requirements are not met, the manager’s hands are tied, and it cannot consent.
Several years ago, borrowers who were familiar with CLO documentation managed to exploit a loophole in the portfolio constraints. Older vintage CLOs (issued pre-2023) had strict restrictions on when a collateral manager could vote in favour of an amendment, but no terms governing when a collateral manager had to actively object to an amendment. These in-the-know borrowers structured “snooze-drag” clauses into their maturity amendments, which allowed a lender that failed to respond to be deemed to have consented. This enables collateral managers who saw value in the maturity extension, but who were unable to vote in favour of the amendment, to “snooze” (instead of objecting) and therefore get “dragged along” and receive the amended asset. CLO investors have since closed the gap on more recent CLOs, which typically now have an active requirement to vote either in favour of or against an amendment, with limited exceptions. Nonetheless, this is an example of the benefits of understanding CLO documentation.
Participation in a distressed restructuring
The difference between a typical institutional investor in leveraged loans and a CLO is most apparent when a borrower is in distress. As noted, CLOs are not structured to be distressed debt funds and instead originally had the expectation that they would sell out of defaulted positions to safeguard the portfolio. Older vintage CLOs therefore have limited ability to participate in restructuring processes, particularly any processes requiring newmoney contributions. Even where CLOs are able to participate, the restructured asset received will often be ascribed a value of zero in the overcollateralisation tests.An exception to this is where it can meet the high bar of satisfying a majority of the eligibility criteria, thereby enabling it to be characterised as a “Restructured Obligation” and potentially receiving par credit. A CLO might therefore be incentivised to sell a distressed asset and reinvest the proceeds into an asset receiving par value credit in the overcollateralisation tests, rather than participate in a restructuring process and receive an economically valuable asset which nonetheless receives zero value within the CLO — i.e., the CLO might prioritise par value creation at the expense of economic value.
Given the increasing prevalence of liability management exercises, there has been an attempt to build flexibility in recent years so that certain restructured assets can receive credit in the borrowing base that better reflects its actual economic value. This effort has been driven by collateral managers and investors in the subordinated tranches of the CLO capital stack who are both incentivised to minimise credit losses given they receive a portion of the remaining capital after more senior noteholders have been paid their fixed amount. However, instead of examining from first principles how CLOs should participate in restructurings, constructs such as “bankruptcy exchanges”, “uptier priming debt” and “loss mitigation obligations” have been bolted on to CLO documentation in a progressive and reactive way as a response to past high-profile liability management exercises. In addition, these constructs have been very narrowly defined and subject to tight concentration limits to get the rating agencies comfortable. This has resulted in an increasingly complex web of constructs that often overlap, but can also result in a CLO being forced to:
- hold the asset at zero value because the restructured asset does not fit neatly into any one construct; or
- prioritise features during a restructuring which other investors might think less pertinent to boosting recovery value. For example, in recent restructurings, CLOs have been known to prioritise the asset’s rating over security packages or pricing structures.
To the extent a borrower or their restructuring advisors are seeking broad lender participation in a restructuring, it is crucial to understand the flexibilities available in CLOs of different vintages, and even the specific CLO holding the debt, because the form of restructuring makes all the difference in whether a CLO can participate; i.e., the form often matters more than the substance. Conversely, where “lender-on lender violence”“Lender-on lender violence” is a restructuring practice whereby a borrower in distress grants a group of lenders a better position in the reorganisation of the debt. This can take the form of the colluding group of lenders receiving super-priority debt, enhanced security packages etc. is being propagated, it would be presumptuous to assume that CLOs will be as passive today as they once were. CLOs are continually evolving but given competing investor interests and rating agency constraints, progress continues to be incremental.
Conclusion
Given how heavily the leveraged loan market relies on CLOs for investment, it would be unwise for a market participant not to familiarise themselves with the constraints a CLO operates under. Ultimately, the CLO market not only acts rationally once its structural incentives are understood, but also relatively homogenously given how similar the terms are across deals of a particular vintage. In addition, while a CLO may structurally have unique incentives, collateral managers are of course still incentivised to maximise returns in the same way a rational institutional investor is, given they receive a proportion of excess distributions as an incentive management fee. Understanding this and tailoring amendments and restructuring processes so that collateral managers can participate is a powerful tool that could, literally, pay.
For more information, please contact the author, Jasleen Gill. Partners Franz Ranero, James Smallwood, and Jack Isaacs, as well as Knowledge Management Counsel Christopher Sullivan, have contributed to this article.