HB 1217 creates a new provision within the Florida Statutes prohibiting governmental entities from adopting or implementing “net zero policies.”CHAPTER 2026-45 Committee Substitute for House Bill No. 1217. The law defines a “net zero policy” as any policy, program, or initiative designed to balance total greenhouse gas emissions with an equal amount removed from the atmosphere.CHAPTER 2026-45 Committee Substitute for House Bill No. 1217; Section 377.816(2)(e). It defines “governmental entity” by reference to Florida’s government-transparency statute,§ 215.985, Fla. Stat. (2025). and “public funds” as all moneys under the jurisdiction or control of a governmental entity.CHAPTER 2026-45 Committee Substitute for House Bill No. 1217; Section 377.816(2)(b).
The law’s legislative findings are explicit: Net zero policies, carbon taxes, and emissions-trading programs are deemed “detrimental” to Florida’s energy security and economic interests.CHAPTER 2026-45 Committee Substitute for House Bill No. 1217; Section 377.816(1). The statute prohibits governmental entities from enacting or enforcing such policies, or requiring others to do so, including as a condition of contracts with third parties.CHAPTER 2026-45 Committee Substitute for House Bill No. 1217; Section 377.816(3). It also bars the use of public funds to support net zero policies through procurement preferences or payments to organizations (such as membership fees or charitable contributions) that adopt, require, or advocate for such policies.CHAPTER 2026-45 Committee Substitute for House Bill No. 1217; Section 377.816(4). Governmental entities must annually submit a compliance affidavit to the Florida Department of Revenue.
While HB 1217 does not impose a new registration, reporting, or disclosure regime on private fund advisers, it raises several practical considerations. For example:
For global managers, the rise of US state-level anti-ESG legislation creates a familiar but increasingly acute transatlantic challenge (as discussed in this Latham report). However, the core tension is less about legal impossibility than hurdles for practical disclosure, marketing, and investor relations.
The European Commission’s Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation (SFDR) 2.0 proposal would move the EU regime toward product categories — transition, sustainable, and ESG-basics — each generally tied to a 70% investment threshold, mandatory exclusions, and more prescriptive rules for sustainability-related claims. Thus, an EU-facing fund may need to document sustainability characteristics, exclusions, or transition objectives to satisfy SFDR 2.0 expectations.
Those same features may now raise questions for Florida public-sector investors if they are described as net zero commitments, fossil-fuel restrictions, emissions caps, or participation in climate-aligned initiatives. They may also prompt scrutiny under Florida HB 3 if they are viewed as reflecting social, political, or ideological objectives rather than pecuniary factors.
Significant questions remain. It is unclear how Florida governmental entities will interpret the prohibition on using public funds to “support, implement, or advance” net zero policies in investment contexts not expressly addressed by the statute, or how broadly they will treat membership in, or payments to, organizations with climate or net zero policies.
On the EU side, SFDR 2.0 implementation details, including final product-category definitions and transition plan disclosure requirements, are expected to be developed through subsequent rulemaking.
For private fund managers, the immediate priority is not wholesale retreat from climate or sustainability strategies, but rather careful calibration. Managers should assess whether their global ESG architecture can be sufficiently modular to satisfy divergent regulatory expectations while minimizing risk and investor or marketing frictions.